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The evolutionary game of establishing a remote consultation system based on the downward allocation of medical resources in a medical alliance

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  • Tao Du
  • Jinyu Li
  • Liuyuanyuan Guo
  • Xiaohu Wang
  • Qiuyue Zhu

Abstract

As a crucial component of hierarchical diagnosis and treatment systems, medical alliances in China are responsible for promoting the downward allocation of high-quality medical resources. Remote consultation, as an essential means to achieve this goal, is of practical importance in the realization of resource sharing between hospitals within medical alliances in China. The existing research on the construction of remote consultations within medical alliances has achieved fruitful results in both theory and practice. However, the establishment of remote consultation involves many factors, and the current research mainly focuses on the influence of traditional economic profit and loss on the construction of remote consultation. In view of the practical problems existing in the operation of medical and health services in China, such as the need to improve the capacity of primary medical and health services and the poor sinking effect of high-quality medical resources, it is of great importance to systematically study the promotion strategy of the construction of remote consultation within the medical alliance to build a reasonable order of medical treatment. Therefore, by determining the logical path formed by the remote consultation channel and on the basis of traditional profit and loss parameters, this paper fully considers the relevant influence of the resource sinking utility caused by the remote consultation channel. The stability of the evolutionary system is analyzed, and a numerical simulation is used to explore the impact of key parameters on system evolution. The research results indicate that the establishment of a remote consultation system between hospitals at different levels is primarily influenced by factors such as the initial proportion of the establishment strategy chosen by both parties, the establishment cost, the distribution proportion of the government subsidy, the distribution proportion of the economic benefit, and the effectiveness proportion in the utility derived from the downward allocation of resources and reputational damage. The findings suggest that moderate to high levels of reputation loss do not significantly influence the final decision-making process for either party. Government subsidies can have an impact on hospital decision-making in the early stages, and in the long term, the resource sinking utility is more appealing than the economic benefits. To a certain extent, this study enriches the related research on remote consultation and the sinking of high-quality medical resources, provides reliable theoretical and method support for the sinking of high-quality medical resources, promotes the construction of remote consultation in medical alliances in China, and provides a decision-making reference and basis for the government and health administrative departments to formulate relevant policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Tao Du & Jinyu Li & Liuyuanyuan Guo & Xiaohu Wang & Qiuyue Zhu, 2024. "The evolutionary game of establishing a remote consultation system based on the downward allocation of medical resources in a medical alliance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(7), pages 1-25, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0305747
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0305747
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    References listed on IDEAS

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