IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Market discipline and subordinated debt: a review of some salient issues

  • Robert R. Bliss
Registered author(s):

    Requiring banks to issue subordinated debt is one proposal to bring market discipline to bear in aiding regulatory supervision. This article explores the frictions that produce a need for discipline (agency problems) and the mechanisms markets have evolved for dealing with these frictions. Following an examination of the rationales and assumptions underlying subordinated debt proposals, the article concludes that the case tying regulatory intervention to subordinated debt spreads is not clear-cut, and that use of all available information, including equity returns and debt yields, when available, is more likely to achieve regulatory goals.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2001/1qepart2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its journal Economic Perspectives.

    Volume (Year): (2001)
    Issue (Month): Q I ()
    Pages: 24-45

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2001:i:qi:p:24-45:n:v.25no.1
    Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O. Box 834, 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690-0834
    Phone: 312/322-5111
    Fax: 312/322-5515
    Web page: http://www.chicagofed.org/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Web: http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/print_publication_order_form.cfm Email:


    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    2. Cheol Park, 2000. "Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2157-2195, October.
    3. Gary Gorton & Richard Rosen, 1994. "Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-09, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Duffee, Gregory R, 1999. "Estimating the Price of Default Risk," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(1), pages 197-226.
    5. Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 641-670.
    6. Nickell, Stephen & Nicolitsas, Daphne & Dryden, Neil, 1997. "What makes firms perform well?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 783-796, April.
    7. Merton, Robert C, 1978. "On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There Are Surveillance Costs," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 439-52, July.
    8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    9. Jaffee, Dwight M., 1975. "Cyclical variations in the risk structure of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 309-325, July.
    10. Farrell, Kathleen A & Whidbee, David A, 2000. "The Consequences of Forced CEO Succession for Outside Directors," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 597-627, October.
    11. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1972. "The Valuation of Option Contracts and a Test of Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 399-417, May.
    12. Pettway, Richard H & Sinkey, Joseph F, Jr, 1980. " Establishing On-Site Bank Examination Priorities: An Early-Warning System Using Accounting and Market Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(1), pages 137-50, March.
    13. Minton, Bernadette A., 1997. "An empirical examination of basic valuation models for plain vanilla U.S. interest rate swaps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 251-277, May.
    14. Cannella Jr., Albert A. & Fraser, Donald R. & Lee, D. Scott, 1995. "Firm failure and managerial labor markets Evidence from Texas banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 185-210, June.
    15. Richard E. Randall, 1989. "Can the market evaluate asset quality exposure in banks?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jul, pages 3-24.
    16. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 1999. "Bond market discipline of banks: is the market tough enough?," Staff Reports 95, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    17. Van Horne, James C., 1979. "Behavior of default-risk premiums for corporate bonds and commercial paper," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 301-313, December.
    18. Stephen Prowse, 1997. "Corporate Control In Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 509-527, December.
    19. Allen N. Berger, 1991. "Market discipline in banking," Proceedings 328, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    20. DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
    21. Alan Greenspan, 2000. "Banking evolution," Proceedings 662, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    22. Hayne E. Leland, 1998. "Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1213-1243, 08.
    23. Fama, Eugene F., 1986. "Term premiums and default premiums in money markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 175-196, September.
    24. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    25. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt as bank capital: a proposal for regulatory reform," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 40-53.
    26. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    27. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    28. R. Alton Gilbert, 1990. "Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18.
    29. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
    30. Black, Fischer & Cox, John C, 1976. "Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 351-67, May.
    31. DeYoung, Robert & Spong, Kenneth & Sullivan, Richard J., 2001. "Who's minding the store? Motivating and monitoring hired managers at small, closely held commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 1209-1243, July.
    32. Peter Ritchken & James Thomson & Ray DeGennaro & Anlong Li, 1991. "On flexibility, capital structure, and investment decisions for the insured bank," Working Paper 9110, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    33. Julapa Jagtiani & George Kaufman & Catharine Lemieux, 1999. "Do markets discipline banks and bank holding companies? evidence from debt pricing," Emerging Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Jun.
    34. Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. " Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-77, September.
    35. Prowse, Stephen, 1997. "Corporate Control in Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 509-27, Winter.
    36. Crabbe, Leland E & Turner, Christopher M, 1995. " Does the Liquidity of a Debt Issue Increase with Its Size? Evidence from the Corporate Bond and Medium-Term Note Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1719-34, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhep:y:2001:i:qi:p:24-45:n:v.25no.1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernie Flores)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.