IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Bank regulation, governance and the crisis: a behavioral finance view

  • Robert Grosse
Registered author(s):

    Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 2008-2009 financial crisis using a behavioral view, and suggest changes in government policy and company governance to deal with the key behavioral problems. Design/methodology/approach – Behavioral elements of the crisis are identified and explained, intermediaries involved in the crisis are reviewed, and both financial institution strategies and public policies are presented to deal with each element. Findings – The behavioral view of the financial market points out that over-optimism, anchoring, hubris and herd behavior are human attributes, and that future crises involving excessive credit extension will occur because of such non-rational behavior. Responses to these elements of the crisis focus on four points: overconfidence related to rising home prices; inability of the market to channel participant behavior in sustainable directions; inadequate financial institution management due to hubris and herd behavior; and inadequate regulation due to regulatory capture and information gaps. Practical implications – Policymakers must see that no policy can eliminate future crises, so they should focus on designing responses to the behaviors of market participants. Raising levels of capital adequacy will help convince the market that the environment is safer, but ultimately new crises will occur anyway. Policy should aim to pre-establish responses to those future asset price bubbles and market-failure conditions. Practitioners must recognize the realities of overconfidence and herd behavior, to design better management that will constrain overextension of credit and excessive risk-taking. Originality/value – A behavioral view has not previously been applied systematically to explain the crisis and to develop responses to it.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Cannot be freely downloaded

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance.

    Volume (Year): 20 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 4-25

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:20:y:2012:i:1:p:4-25
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK
    Web: Email:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
    2. Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, . "Learning To Be Overconfident," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-97, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working papers 506, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. Maximiliano González & Renato Modernell & Elisa París, 2006. "Herding Behaviour Inside the Board: an experimental approach," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 388-405, 09.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:20:y:2012:i:1:p:4-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Louise Lister)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.