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Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India

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  • Das, Upasak

Abstract

The paper investigates prevalence of political clientelism in allocation of benefits under the rural employment guarantee program, currently implemented in India. Using survey data collected from some villages of West Bengal, it is found that households, which are politically active and supporters of the local ruling political party, are more likely to receive the benefits in terms of participation, number of days of work and earnings from the program. Qualitative evidence corroborates the findings. The study shows predominance of political favoritism under the program and lays emphasis on reducing rationing and enhancing awareness of the entitlements to curb this practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Das, Upasak, 2015. "Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 202-217.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:67:y:2015:i:c:p:202-217
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kaletski, Elizabeth & Prakash, Nishith, 2016. "Does Political Reservation for Minorities Affect Child Labor? Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 50-69.
    2. Sudha Narayanan & Nicolas Gerber, 2015. "Social safety nets for food and nutritional security in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2015-031, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    3. repec:eee:wdevel:v:103:y:2018:i:c:p:284-296 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Akerkar, Supriya & Joshi, P.C. & Fordham, Maureen, 2016. "Cultures of Entitlement and Social Protection: Evidence from Flood Prone Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 46-58.
    5. Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K. & Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K., 2016. "Short-term effects of India's employment guarantee program on labor markets and agricultural productivity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7665, The World Bank.
    6. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2016. "Local institutional structure and clientelistic access to employment: the case of MGNREGS in three states of India," Working papers 269, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    7. Singh, Sanjeet, 2016. "Evaluation of world’s largest social welfare scheme: An assessment using non-parametric approach," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 16-29.
    8. Sudha Narayanan Narayanan & Nicolas Gerber, 2016. "Safety Nets for Food and Nutritional Security in India," FOODSECURE Working papers 37, LEI Wageningen UR.
    9. repec:eee:wdevel:v:100:y:2017:i:c:p:31-44 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Huber, Amelie & Joshi, Deepa, 2015. "Hydropower, Anti-Politics, and the Opening of New Political Spaces in the Eastern Himalayas," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 13-25.

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