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Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India

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  • Das, Upasak

Abstract

The paper investigates prevalence of political clientelism in allocation of benefits under the rural employment guarantee program, currently implemented in India. Using survey data collected from some villages of West Bengal, it is found that households, which are politically active and supporters of the local ruling political party, are more likely to receive the benefits in terms of participation, number of days of work and earnings from the program. Qualitative evidence corroborates the findings. The study shows predominance of political favoritism under the program and lays emphasis on reducing rationing and enhancing awareness of the entitlements to curb this practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Das, Upasak, 2015. "Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 202-217.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:67:y:2015:i:c:p:202-217
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.009
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