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Electoral Competition and Local Government Responsiveness in Brazil

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  • Arvate, Paulo Roberto

Abstract

The empirical literature on the effects of competition on the supply of public goods shows controversial results at the local level. The main objective of this paper is to investigate this relationship in a federalist country (Brazil) where the political system places few barriers to the entry of competitors and local governments have the independence to establish their own public policy. We show that a higher effective number of candidates running for the executive branch increase the supply of local public goods (the number of student enrollments, teachers, and free immunizations).

Suggested Citation

  • Arvate, Paulo Roberto, 2013. "Electoral Competition and Local Government Responsiveness in Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 67-83.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:43:y:2013:i:c:p:67-83
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.11.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Timmons, Jeffrey F. & Garfias, Francisco, 2015. "Revealed Corruption, Taxation, and Fiscal Accountability: Evidence from Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 13-27.
    2. Rojas Rivera, Angela Milena & Molina Guerra, Carlos A., 2015. "A Comparative Analysis of Political Competition and Local Provision of Public Goods: Brazil, Colombia and Mexico(1991-2010)," MPRA Paper 67383, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Oct 2015.
    3. Arvate, Paulo Roberto & Figueiredo, Dalila, 2016. "Another argument against negotiated grants: how the bill for local corruption is distributed," Textos para discussão 432, FGV/EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    4. Cunha, Alexandre B. & Ornelas, Emanuel, 2017. "The Limits of Political Compromise: Debt Ceilings and Political Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 11945, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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