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An ecological perspective on interest groups and economic stagnation

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  • Brunk, Gregory G.
  • Hunter, Kennith G.

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  • Brunk, Gregory G. & Hunter, Kennith G., 2008. "An ecological perspective on interest groups and economic stagnation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 194-212, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:37:y:2008:i:1:p:194-212
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