Why do companies issue sukuk?
This paper investigates the determinants for firms to choose sukuk over conventional bond. We investigate the potential impact of information asymmetries through moral hazard and adverse selection to explain why firms prefer using sukuk. We perform logit regressions of the choice of debt type to determine which characteristics lead a firm to issue a sukuk rather than a bond. We use a dataset of sukuk and conventional bond issuances in Malaysia from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of the influence of information asymmetries and adverse selection on the choice of the sukuk market.
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