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Green human resource management – A personnel economics perspective

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  • Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard

Abstract

The Stern-Stiglitz Report on carbon pricing emphasizes that environmental policy must not only cope with market failures, but also with government and organizational failures. Focusing on the latter, this paper investigates how some practices central to human resource management – employee selection and training, performance appraisal and rewards, employee discretion and empowerment – can be jointly deployed to direct managerial attention adequately. Using a static multi-task principal-agent model and standard monotone comparative statics tools, I derive predictions/prescriptions on how these practices should adjust as the firm's stakes in sustainability increase. These prescriptions notably include some qualifications concerning the outsourcing of environmental services and employee training, and some implications for public policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2021. "Green human resource management – A personnel economics perspective," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0928765521000464
    DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2021.101261
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    Cited by:

    1. Rangpeng Liu & Zhuo Yue & Ali Ijaz & Abdalwali Lutfi & Jie Mao, 2023. "Sustainable Business Performance: Examining the Role of Green HRM Practices, Green Innovation and Responsible Leadership through the Lens of Pro-Environmental Behavior," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-20, April.
    2. Ruth Oluyemi Bamidele & Ali Ozturen & Mine Haktanir & Oluwatobi A. Ogunmokun, 2023. "Realizing Green Airport Performance through Green Management Intransigence, Airport Reputation, Biospheric Value, and Eco-Design," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-26, January.
    3. Fatimah Mahdy & Mohammad Alqahtani & Faiz Binzafrah, 2023. "Imperatives, Benefits, and Initiatives of Green Human Resource Management (GHRM): A Systematic Literature Review," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-31, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental management; Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) approach; Multi-task principal-agent analysis; Economics of attention;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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