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Induced technical change and international agreements under greenhouse warming

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  • Xepapadeas, A.

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  • Xepapadeas, A., 1995. "Induced technical change and international agreements under greenhouse warming," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-23, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:17:y:1995:i:1:p:1-23
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    5. Michael Hoel, 1991. "Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 93-108.
    6. Nordhaus, William, 1982. "How Fast Should We Graze the Global Commons?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 242-246, May.
    7. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
    8. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    9. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249.
    10. d'Arge, Ralph C & Schulze, William D & Brookshire, David S, 1982. "Carbon Dioxide and Intergenerational Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 251-256, May.
    11. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
    12. J. R. Hicks, 1963. "The Theory of Wages," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-00189-7, September.
    13. Pearce, David W, 1991. "The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 938-948, July.
    14. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    15. Nordhaus, William D, 1991. "A Sketch of the Economics of the Greenhouse Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 146-150, May.
    16. John Firor, 1990. "The Straight Story About The Greenhouse Effect," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(3), pages 3-15, July.
    17. Martin Wade E. & Patrick Robert H. & Tolwinski Boleslaw, 1993. "A Dynamic Game of a Transboundary Pollutant with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-12, July.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Hoel & Rolf Golombek, 2004. "Climate Agreements and Technology Policy," Working Papers 2004.90, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. El-Sayed, Abeer & Rubio, Santiago J., 2014. "Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 168-180.
    3. William Brock & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2024. "Land-use, climate change and the emergence of infectious diseases: A synthesis," DEOS Working Papers 2409, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    4. Boucekkine, Raouf & Ruan, Weihua & Zou, Benteng, 2023. "The irreversible pollution game," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    5. Santiago J. Rubio, 2001. "International Cooperation In Pollution Control," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    6. Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2022. "Why and when coalitions split? An alternative analytical approach with an application to environmental agreements," Working Papers halshs-03676670, HAL.
    7. Calvo, Emilio & Rubio, Santiago J., 2013. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 6(4), pages 289-339, April.
    8. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1996. "Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 95-110, April.
    9. Wei Jin, 2012. "International Knowledge Spillover and Technology Externality: Why Multilateral R&D Coordination Matters for Global Climate Governance," CAMA Working Papers 2012-53, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    10. Ansuategi, Alberto & Escapa, Marta, 2002. "Economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 23-37, January.
    11. Golombek, Rolf & Hoel, Michael, 2008. "Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 197-208, May.
    12. Wenguang Tang & Shuhua Zhang, 2019. "Modeling and Computation of Transboundary Pollution Game Based on Joint Implementation Mechanism," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-18, August.
    13. N. Baris Vardar & Georges Zaccour, 2020. "Exploitation of a Productive Asset in the Presence of Strategic Behavior and Pollution Externalities," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(10), pages 1-28, October.
    14. Golombek Rolf & Hoel Michael, 2006. "Second-Best Climate Agreements and Technology Policy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, January.
    15. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 1998. "Policy Adoption Rules and Global Warming," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 635-646, April.
    16. Jin, Wei, 2016. "International technology diffusion, multilateral R&D coordination, and global climate mitigation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 357-372.
    17. Ni, Jian & Huang, Hongzhi & Wang, Peipei & Zhou, Wei, 2020. "Capacity investment and green R&D in a dynamic oligopoly under the potential shift in environmental damage," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 312-319.

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