Equilibrium with a market of permits
In this paper we present the main results of three original studies on the equilibrium with a market of tradeable permits in a static framework. In first study, we have considered an international equilibrium of two countries which depend on the quantity of permits to each country. The allocation is efficient if and only if it is proportional to efficient labor. A redistribution in favor of the less developed country implies a redistribution to this country but leads to a dilemma with efficiency. In the second study, we analyze the consequences of the choice between giving free permits to firms and other possibilities. We show that for equalizing incomes of production factors with there marginal productivities, each factor should receive a quantity of free permits proportional to its contribution to production. In the third study, we consider the partial equilibrium of an industry where each firm is characterized by a parameter combining production efficiency and pollution effect. We define a theoretical indicator of environmental efficiency and we analyze its properties.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pierre-André Jouvet & Philippe Michel & Gilles Rotillon, 2004.
"A theoretical measure of environmental efficiency,"
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques
v04011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Fare, Rolf, et al, 1989. "Multilateral Productivity Comparisons When Some Outputs Are Undesirable: A Nonparametric Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(1), pages 90-98, February.
- Jouvet, P.-A. & Michel, P. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999.
"Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment,"
99a03, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- Hahn, Robert W, 1989. "Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 95-114, Spring.
- Stokey, Nancy L, 1998. "Are There Limits to Growth?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1994. "North-South Trade and the Environment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 755-87, August.
- Ono, Tetsuo, 2001.
"The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment,"
33, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Tetsuo Ono, 2002. "The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(1), pages 75-87, January.
- Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
- P-A. Jouvet & P. Michel & G. Rotillon, 2002. "Capital Allocation and International Equilibrium with Pollution Permits," THEMA Working Papers 2002-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Noll, Roger G, 1982. "Implementing Marketable Emissions Permits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 120-24, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:59:y:2005:i:2:p:148-163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.