Intergenerational altruism and the environment
This paper constructs an overlapping generations model of pollution externality wherein individ- uals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption can be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals’ altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and prove that it can be decentralised.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997041. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.