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The micro-empirics of collective action: The case of business improvement districts

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  • Brooks, Leah
  • Strange, William C.

Abstract

This paper carries out a micro-level analysis of collective goods provision by focusing on the formation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). The paper's theoretical and empirical analysis is unusually complete in that it considers the entire process of collective action, including participation in initial organization, voting, and ultimate impact on property values. BID benefits are shown to be highly uneven, and BID formation is not a Pareto improvement. Furthermore, large “anchor participants” benefit disproportionately, and are crucial for the viability of the institution, consistent with Olson (1965). These results, while demonstrated in a particular setting, apply to collective action more generally. Whenever a market failure leaves room for a collective response, the presence of anchor participants encourages collective action, and the action – even though in a sense voluntary – has uneven benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Brooks, Leah & Strange, William C., 2011. "The micro-empirics of collective action: The case of business improvement districts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1358-1372.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:11:p:1358-1372
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.015
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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Guimarães, 2021. "Business Improvement Districts: A Systematic Review of an Urban Governance Model towards City Center Revitalization," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-24, September.
    2. Faggio, G., 2022. "The Impact of Business Improvement Districts on Crime," Working Papers 22/03, Department of Economics, City University London.
    3. Li Zhou, 2014. "Commercial Revitalization In Low-Income Urban Communities: The Holdup Problem And Urban Development Policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(3), pages 545-559, July.
    4. Miller, Mark V., 2013. "Valuing local collective goods: the case of business improvement districts," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150635, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. KONDO Keisuke & OKUBO Toshihiro, 2020. "The Revitalization of Shrinking Cities: Lessons from the Japanese Service Sector," Discussion papers 20050, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    6. Daniel Kudla & Michael Courey, 2019. "Managing territorial stigmatization from the ‘middle’: The revitalization of a post-industrial Business Improvement Area," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 51(2), pages 351-373, March.
    7. Rachel Soloveichik, 2019. "Accounting for Improved Brick and Mortar Shopping Experiences," BEA Working Papers 0165, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
    8. Natalia Vasilenok, 2018. "What Drives the Private Provision of Security: Evidence from Russian Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 197/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Wonhyung Lee, 2016. "Struggles to form business improvement districts (BIDs) in Los Angeles," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 53(16), pages 3423-3438, December.
    10. John Charles Bradbury, 2022. "The impact of sports stadiums on localized commercial activity: Evidence from a Business Improvement District," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 194-217, January.
    11. Andrew Hanson, 2021. "Taxes and Economic Development: An Update on the State of the Economics Literature," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 35(3), pages 232-253, August.

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