Interactive learning in 2×2 normal form games by neural network agents
This paper models the learning process of populations of randomly rematched tabula rasa neural network (NN) agents playing randomly generated 2×2 normal form games of all strategic classes. This approach has greater external validity than the existing models in the literature, each of which is usually applicable to narrow subsets of classes of games (often a single game) and/or to fixed matching protocols. The learning prowess of NNs with hidden layers was impressive as they learned to play unique pure strategy equilibria with near certainty, adhered to principles of dominance and iterated dominance, and exhibited a preference for risk-dominant equilibria. In contrast, perceptron NNs were found to perform significantly worse than hidden layer NN agents and human subjects in experimental studies.
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Volume (Year): 391 (2012)
Issue (Month): 22 ()
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