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Identifying the end: Minimum production thresholds for natural gas wells

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  • Weber, Jeremy G.
  • Ercoli, Thomas
  • Fitzgerald, Will
  • Nied, Paige
  • Penderville, Molly
  • Raabe, Eric

Abstract

State governments require that oil and gas operators decommission wells at the end of their useful life, allowing the land to be put to other uses and reducing the risk that the well becomes (or remains) a threat to human health or the environment. Because decommissioning is costly and generates no revenue, operators have incentive to postpone it. Our survey of thirteen major producing states shows that they generally allow operators to keep wells open as long as they produce any oil or gas, thereby permitting nearly indefinite postponement of decommissioning. We then consider conventional natural gas wells in Pennsylvania as a case study and estimate the production needed to cover operating costs based on data from the state's largest operator of conventional wells. We find that conventional natural gas wells producing below 0.5 thousand cubic feet (Mcf) per day are highly likely to be uneconomical even if gas prices rise considerably. We apply the 0.5 Mcf per day threshold to a sample of the state's aging wells. As of 2019, only 4 percent of sample wells had been decommissioned, and the threshold suggests that an additional one-third of wells in the state are likely uneconomical and in need of decommissioning. More generally, using thresholds to identify uneconomical wells could increase the number of wells being properly decommissioned and decrease those becoming the responsibility of the state, benefiting the environment, those living near wells, and taxpayers.

Suggested Citation

  • Weber, Jeremy G. & Ercoli, Thomas & Fitzgerald, Will & Nied, Paige & Penderville, Molly & Raabe, Eric, 2021. "Identifying the end: Minimum production thresholds for natural gas wells," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:74:y:2021:i:c:s030142072100413x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2021.102404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Foreman, R. Dean & Kleit, Andrew N., 2023. "Is prorationing efficiency-enhancing or rent-seeking?: Evidence from a natural experiment," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decommissioning; Natural gas wells; Pennsylvania; Oil and gas policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity

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