Partial knowledge is a dangerous thing - On the value of asymmetric fundamental information in asset markets
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Glenn Boyle & Gerald Ward, 2016. "Do Better Informed Investors Always Do Better?," Working Papers in Economics 16/29, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
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More about this item
KeywordsInformation economics Experimental economics Agent-based model Overconfidence Value of information;
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