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After the deal: Talk, trust building and the implementation of negotiated agreements

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  • Mislin, Alexandra A.
  • Campagna, Rachel L.
  • Bottom, William P.

Abstract

The success of a negotiated agreement depends on implementation and implications for future exchange between the parties. This paper examines structural, affective and contractual factors that influence implementation behavior. Predictions derived from contract theory and recent negotiation theories were tested in two laboratory studies involving the negotiation of an employment contract. In Experiment 1 trust formation facilitated by so-called "cheap" talk and the provision of a sufficient contingent contract promoted vigorous contract implementation. Positive affect induced in the employer prior to negotiation had no discernable effect on subsequent implementation. In Experiment 2 induced employee positive affect did motivate implementation behavior but the effect hinged on the form of the contract. Small talk before contracting increased employee's willingness to be financially vulnerable in subsequent exchange with the employer. Implications for general negotiation theory are considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Mislin, Alexandra A. & Campagna, Rachel L. & Bottom, William P., 2011. "After the deal: Talk, trust building and the implementation of negotiated agreements," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 55-68, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:115:y:2011:i:1:p:55-68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Chua, Roy Y.J. & Morris, Michael W. & Mor, Shira, 2012. "Collaborating across cultures: Cultural metacognition and affect-based trust in creative collaboration," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 116-131.
    3. Hart, Einav & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2020. "Getting to less: When negotiating harms post-agreement performance," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 155-175.
    4. Hart, Einav & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2022. "When we should care more about relationships than favorable deal terms in negotiation: The economic relevance of relational outcomes (ERRO)," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    5. Bhatia, Nazlı & Gunia, Brian C., 2018. "“I was going to offer $10,000 but…”: The effects of phantom anchors in negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 70-86.
    6. Jingjing Yao & Martin Storme, 2021. "Trust Building via Negotiation: Immediate versus Lingering Effects of General Trust and Negotiator Satisfaction," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 507-528, June.
    7. Andrew B. Whitford & William P. Bottom & Gary J. Miller, 2013. "The (Negligible) Benefit of Moving First: Efficiency and Equity in Principal-Agent Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 499-518, May.
    8. Livia Levine, 2019. "Digital Trust and Cooperation with an Integrative Digital Social Contract," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 393-407, December.
    9. Nguyen, Yen, 2019. "Emotions and strategic interactions," Other publications TiSEM 3358deab-10bb-4b50-a147-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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