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After the deal: Talk, trust building and the implementation of negotiated agreements

  • Mislin, Alexandra A.
  • Campagna, Rachel L.
  • Bottom, William P.
Registered author(s):

    The success of a negotiated agreement depends on implementation and implications for future exchange between the parties. This paper examines structural, affective and contractual factors that influence implementation behavior. Predictions derived from contract theory and recent negotiation theories were tested in two laboratory studies involving the negotiation of an employment contract. In Experiment 1 trust formation facilitated by so-called "cheap" talk and the provision of a sufficient contingent contract promoted vigorous contract implementation. Positive affect induced in the employer prior to negotiation had no discernable effect on subsequent implementation. In Experiment 2 induced employee positive affect did motivate implementation behavior but the effect hinged on the form of the contract. Small talk before contracting increased employee's willingness to be financially vulnerable in subsequent exchange with the employer. Implications for general negotiation theory are considered.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.

    Volume (Year): 115 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (May)
    Pages: 55-68

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:115:y:2011:i:1:p:55-68
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp

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