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What do People Value when they Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation

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  • Curhan, Jared R.
  • Elfenbein, Hillary Anger
  • Xu, Heng

Abstract

Four studies provide support for the development and validation of a framework for understanding the range of social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as consequences of negotiations. Study 1 inductively elicited and coded elements of subjective value among students, community members, and negotiation practitioners, revealing 20 categories that negotiation theorists in Study 2 sorted to reveal four underlying dimensions: Feelings about Instrumental Outcomes, the Self, Process, and Relationship. Study 3 proposed a new Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) questionnaire and confirmed its 4-factor structure, and Study 4 presents convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity data for this SVI. Results suggest the SVI is a promising tool to systematize and encourage research on the subjective outcomes of negotiation.

Suggested Citation

  • Curhan, Jared R. & Elfenbein, Hillary Anger & Xu, Heng, 2005. "What do People Value when they Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation," Working papers 18234, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:18234
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    Cited by:

    1. Manfred Königstein & Marie Claire Villeval, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations," Post-Print halshs-00175021, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Negotiation; social psychological outcomes; subjective value;
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