Voter decisions on eminent domain and police power reforms
One unresolved issue arising from the use of eminent domain power involves how the perceived benefits and costs of eminent domain power affect people’s positions on the reform of eminent domain and police power law. The paper addresses this issue by estimating a voting model that explains voters’ decisions on eminent domain and police power reform referenda in the US. Estimates indicate that eminent domain referendum outcomes hinged on voters’ fundamental values and ideology, and voters’ immediate self-interest. Voters’ fundamental values and ideology affects referendum outcomes insofar as educational attainment in a county has a statistically significant effect on support for reform. Despite the greater incidence of eminent domain in low income and poorer communities, success of reform referenda in this study was found to be greater in counties with higher incomes and lower unemployment rates. This implies that whatever asymmetry exists in the exercise of eminent domain law across income groups does not affect voter reaction to eminent domain reforms. Moreover, counties with high unemployment rates consider the larger potential benefits from urban renewal projects in vote decision-making providing a link between self-interest and voting behavior.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Deacon, Robert T & Shapiro, Perry, 1975. "Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed Through Voting on Referenda," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 943-55, December.
- Matthew E. Kahn, 2002. "Demographic change and the demand for environmental regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(1), pages 45-62.
- Fridstrom, Lasse & Elvik, Rune, 1997. "The Barely Revealed Preference behind Road Investment Priorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 145-68, July.
- James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 475-492 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matsusaka, J.C., 1991.
"Election Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence from California Ballot Propositions,"
91-29, Southern California - School of Business Administration.
- Matsusaka, John G, 1993. "Election Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence from California Ballot Propositions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 313-34, August.
- Kotchen, Matthew J. & Powers, Shawn M., 2006.
"Explaining the appearance and success of voter referenda for open-space conservation,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 373-390, July.
- Matthew J. Kotchen & Shawn M. Powers, 2004. "Explaining The Appearance and Success of Voter Referenda For Open-Space Conservation," Department of Economics Working Papers 2004-06, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- David Popp, 2001. "Altruism and the Demand for Environmental Quality," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(3), pages 339-349.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Kahn, Matthew E & Matsusaka, John G, 1997. "Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 137-73, April.
- Jon H. Goldstein & William D. Watson, 1997. "Property Rights, Regulatory Taking, And Compensation: Implications For Environmental Protection," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(4), pages 32-42, October.
- Riddiough, Timothy J., 1997. "The Economic Consequences of Regulatory Taking Risk on Land Value and Development Activity," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 56-77, January.
- Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-76, June.
- Fischel, William A., 1979. "Determinants of voting on environmental quality: A study of a New Hampshire pulp mill referendum," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 107-118, June.
- Lopez Edward J. & Jewell R. Todd & Campbell Noel D., 2009. "Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 101-135, April.
- Weisenfeld, Ursula & Ott, Ingrid, 2011. "Academic discipline and risk perception of technologies: An empirical study," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 487-499, April.
- Steven P. Lanza, 2006. "An Offer You Can't Refuse: Why Do Connecticut and Other States Use Eminent Domain?," The Connecticut Economy, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, issue Winter.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:21:y:2012:i:2:p:187-194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.