IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article

Leverage and preemptive selling of financial institutions

  • Bernardo, Antonio E.
  • Welch, Ivo

In our model, financial firms’ leverage choices and asset sales impose negative externalities on other financial firms. This means that individual firms cannot determine their optimal capitalizations in isolation, but have to take the aggregate financial sector characteristics into account. In particular, they become more aggressive when their peers are more conservative. Furthermore, financial firms over-consume liquidity in equilibrium. For some parameter regions, small parameter changes can induce large differences in the equilibrium allocation of risk. Historical experience is not necessarily a good guide as to whether the prevailing equilibrium is fragile or not.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957312000411
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Volume (Year): 22 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 123-151

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:123-151
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Péter Kondor, 2009. "Risk in Dynamic Arbitrage: The Price Effects of Convergence Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 631-655, 04.
  2. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002. "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," NBER Working Papers 8937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Gromb, Denis & Vayanos, Dimitri, 2002. "Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 361-407.
  4. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pederson, 2003. "Predatory trading," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24829, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Andrei Shleifer ad Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "The Limits of Arbitrage," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1725, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2004. "Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 455-483, June.
  7. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
  8. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2007. "Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures," Bank of England working papers 328, Bank of England.
  9. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Liquidity Black Holes," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm425, Yale School of Management.
  10. Xiong, Wei, 2001. "Convergence trading with wealth effects: an amplification mechanism in financial markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 247-292, November.
  11. John Geanakoplos & Ana Fostel, 2008. "Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1211-44, September.
  12. Chowdhry, Bhagwan & Nanda, Vikram, 1998. "Leverage and Market Stability: The Role of Margin Rules and Price Limits," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(2), pages 179-210, April.
  13. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2007. "Market liquidity and funding liquidity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24478, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. Isabel Schnabel & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Liquidity and Contagion: The Crisis of 1763," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 929-968, December.
  15. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2011. "Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 557-591.
  16. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-66, September.
  17. Viral V. Acharya & S. Viswanathan, 2010. "Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 15837, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 2006. "The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 293-315, February.
  19. Bruce Ian Carlin & Miguel Sousa Lobo & S. Viswanathan, 2007. "Episodic Liquidity Crises: Cooperative and Predatory Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(5), pages 2235-2274, October.
  20. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  21. Viral V. Acharya & Hyun Song Shin & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2009. "Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 15567, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Viral V. Acharya & Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," NBER Working Papers 15674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, 2004. "Liquidity and Financial Market Runs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 135-158.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:123-151. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.