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Predatory Trading

  • Markus K Brunnermeier
  • Lasse Heje Pederson

This paper studies predatory trading: trading that induces and/or exploits other investors' need to reduce their positions. We show that if one trader needs to sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshooting, and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid when liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader profits from triggering another trader's crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders and across assets.

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Paper provided by Financial Markets Group in its series FMG Discussion Papers with number dp441.

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Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp441
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  9. De Long, J Bradford, et al, 1990. " Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 379-95, June.
  10. Grossman, S.J. & Miller, M.H., 1988. "Liquidity And Market Structure," Papers 88, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
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  12. Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2002. "Does Arbitrage Flatten Demand Curves for Stocks?," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(4), pages 583-608, October.
  13. Martin D.D. Evans, H. Henry Cao, Richard K. Lyons, 2003. "Inventory Information," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-33, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  14. Darrell Duffie & Nicolae Garleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2005. "Over-the-Counter Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1815-1847, November.
  15. Shleifer, Andrei, 1986. " Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(3), pages 579-90, July.
  16. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
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  18. Jarrow, Robert A., 1992. "Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(03), pages 311-336, September.
  19. Gerard Gennotte and Hayne Leland., 1989. "Market Liquidity, Hedging and Crashes," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-192, University of California at Berkeley.
  20. Albert S. Kyle, 2001. "Contagion as a Wealth Effect," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1401-1440, 08.
  21. Radner, Roy, 1980. "Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 136-154, April.
  22. Chan, Louis K C & Lakonishok, Josef, 1995. " The Behavior of Stock Prices around Institutional Trades," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1147-74, September.
  23. Madrigal, Vicente, 1996. " Non-fundamental Speculation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 553-78, June.
  24. Antonio Bernardo & Ivo Welch, 2006. "Liquidity and Financial Market Runs," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm280, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Aug 2003.
  25. Lynch, Anthony W & Mendenhall, Richard R, 1997. "New Evidence on Stock Price Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 Index," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 351-83, July.
  26. Longstaff, Francis A, 2001. "Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Valuation of Illiquid Securities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 407-31.
  27. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
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