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Breaking down the barriers: Competition, syndicate structure, and underwriting incentives

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  • Shivdasani, Anil
  • Song, Wei-Ling

Abstract

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.

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  • Shivdasani, Anil & Song, Wei-Ling, 2011. "Breaking down the barriers: Competition, syndicate structure, and underwriting incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 581-600, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:99:y:2011:i:3:p:581-600
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    4. Alan D Morrison & Carola Schenone & Aaron Thegeya & William J WilhelmJr., 2018. "Investment-Banking Relationships: 1933–2007," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 194-244.
    5. Kenneth A. Carow & Edward J. Kane & Rajesh P. Narayanan, 2011. "Safety‐Net Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(7), pages 1371-1398, October.
    6. Connie X. Mao & Wei-Ling Song, 2021. "Does Reciprocity Affect Analysts’ Incentives to Release Timely Information? Evidence from Syndication Relationships in Securities Underwriting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 617-639, January.
    7. Carbó-Valverde, Santiago & Cuadros-Solas, Pedro J. & Rodríguez-Fernández, Francisco, 2021. "The impact of lending relationships on the choice and structure of bond underwriting syndicates," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Liu, Wenchien & Miu, Peter & Chang, Yuanchen & Ozdemir, Bogie, 2012. "Information asymmetry and bank regulation: Can the spread of debt contracts be explained by recovery rates?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 123-150.
    9. Carbó-Valverde, Santiago & Cuadros-Solas, Pedro J. & Rodríguez-Fernández, Francisco, 2021. "Non-pricing drivers of underwriters’ market shares in corporate bond markets," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 671-693.
    10. Christian Andres & André Betzer & Peter Limbach, 2013. "Underwriter Reputation and the Quality of Certification: Evidence from High-Yield Bonds," Schumpeter Discussion Papers SDP13006, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
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