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Safety-Net Losses from Abandoning Glass-Steagall Restrictions

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  • KENNETH A. CAROW
  • EDWARD J. KANE
  • RAJESH P. NARAYANAN

Abstract

This paper evaluates the redistribution of gains surrounding regulatory relaxations in 1996 and 1997 and ultimate passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999. Gains in financial institution stocks may come from projected increases in efficiency, increases in the bargaining power of financial institutions, or greater access to the federal safety net. For customers seeking improved access to capital markets, gains in efficiency should result in increased benefits, but increases in bank bargaining power could increase funding costs and/or decrease capital market access. Customers may also lose as taxpayers who support the federal safety net. This paper finds evidence of potential taxpayer losses and increased bank bargaining power, especially vis‐à‐vis credit‐constrained customers for whom safety‐net subsidies are unlikely to be shifted forward. The stock prices of credit‐constrained customers declined during FSMA event windows and in event windows associated with regulatory relaxations.
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Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth A. Carow & Edward J. Kane & Rajesh P. Narayanan, 2011. "Safety-Net Losses from Abandoning Glass-Steagall Restrictions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(7), pages 1371-1398, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:43:y:2011:i:7:p:1371-1398
    DOI: j.1538-4616.2011.00428.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ghosh, Chinmoy & Petrova, Milena, 2013. "Does deregulation induce competition in the market for corporate control? The special case of banking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5220-5235.
    2. Faff, Robert W. & Parwada, Jerry T. & Tan, Eric K.M., 2019. "Did connected hedge funds benefit from bank bailouts during the financial crisis?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.
    3. Abreu, Emmanuel Sousa de & Kimura, Herbert & Sobreiro, Vinicius Amorim, 2019. "What is going on with studies on banking efficiency?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 195-219.
    4. Gerald Epstein, 2018. "On the Social Efficiency of Finance," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 49(2), pages 330-352, March.
    5. Hendrik Hakenes & Iftekhar Hasan & PhilIP Molyneux & Ru Xie, 2015. "Small Banks and Local Economic Development," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 653-683.
    6. Stefano Colonnello, 2022. "The Real Effects of Universal Banking: Does Access to the Public Debt Market Matter?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 77-110, February.
    7. Hendrik Hakenes & Iftekhar Hasan & PhilIP Molyneux & Ru Xie, 2015. "Small Banks and Local Economic Development," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 653-683.

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