IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v106y2012i2p229-246.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Doing battle with short sellers: The conflicted role of blockholders in bear raids

Author

Listed:
  • Khanna, Naveen
  • Mathews, Richmond D.

Abstract

If short sellers can destroy firm value by manipulating prices down, an informed blockholder has a powerful natural incentive to protect the value of his stake by trading against them. However, he also has a potentially conflicting incentive to use his information to generate trading profits. We show that a speculator can exploit this conflict and force the blockholder to buy a disproportionately large amount to prevent value destruction. This is costly for the blockholder because the trades must sometimes be executed at inflated prices. Given reasonable constraints on short sellers, a sufficiently large blockholder will have the incentive to absorb these losses and prevent a bear raid. However, conditions exist under which outside intervention may be warranted.

Suggested Citation

  • Khanna, Naveen & Mathews, Richmond D., 2012. "Doing battle with short sellers: The conflicted role of blockholders in bear raids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 229-246.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:106:y:2012:i:2:p:229-246
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X12001328
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Attari, Mukarram & Banerjee, Suman & Noe, Thomas H., 2006. "Crushed by a rational stampede: Strategic share dumping and shareholder insurrections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 181-222, January.
    2. Chakraborty, Archishman & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2004. "Informed manipulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 132-152, January.
    3. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997. "Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1087-1129, July.
    4. Robert A. Jarrow, 2008. "Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and Short Squeezes," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Financial Derivatives Pricing Selected Works of Robert Jarrow, chapter 6, pages 105-130, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    6. Edmans, Alex, 2011. "Short-term termination without deterring long-term investment: A theory of debt and buyouts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 81-101, October.
    7. Alex Edmans, 2009. "Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(6), pages 2481-2513, December.
    8. Antoine Faure-Grimaud, 2004. "Public Trading and Private Incentives," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(4), pages 985-1014.
    9. Art Durnev & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 65-105, February.
    10. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1999. "Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 949-970.
    11. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1988. "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 601-611, May.
    12. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1992. "Stock-Price Manipulation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 503-529.
    13. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1996. "Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 124-147, Spring.
    14. Qi Chen & Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, 2007. "Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 619-650.
    15. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, 2009. "The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2445-2485, July.
    16. Vila, Jean-Luc, 1989. "Simple games of market manipulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 21-26.
    17. Steven N. Kaplan & Tobias J. Moskowitz & Berk A. Sensoy, 2013. "The Effects of Stock Lending on Security Prices: An Experiment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(5), pages 1891-1936, October.
    18. Khanna, Naveen & Slezak, Steve L & Bradley, Michael, 1994. "Insider Trading, Outside Search, and Resource Allocation: Why Firms and Society May Disagree on Insider Trading Restrictions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 575-608.
    19. Itay Goldstein & Alexander Guembel, 2008. "Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 133-164.
    20. Miller, Edward M, 1977. "Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1151-1168, September.
    21. Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 1998. "Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 99-129, February.
    22. Duffie, Darrell & Garleanu, Nicolae & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2002. "Securities lending, shorting, and pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 307-339.
    23. Geczy, Christopher C. & Musto, David K. & Reed, Adam V., 2002. "Stocks are special too: an analysis of the equity lending market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 241-269.
    24. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1998. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-25, February.
    25. Jones, Charles M. & Lamont, Owen A., 2002. "Short-sale constraints and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 207-239.
    26. Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan, 2008. "Feedback Effects and Asset Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1939-1975, August.
    27. Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2395-2428.
    28. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
    29. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, 2001. "Feedback from Stock Prices to Cash Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2389-2413, December.
    30. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-887, August.
    31. Clifford G. Holderness, 2009. "The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1377-1408, April.
    32. Ernst Maug, 1998. "Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-98, February.
    33. Yuanzhi Luo, 2005. "Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1951-1982, August.
    34. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    35. Philip Bond & Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein, 2012. "The Real Effects of Financial Markets," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 339-360, October.
    36. Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, 2012. "The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 933-971, June.
    37. Diamond, Douglas W. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1987. "Constraints on short-selling and asset price adjustment to private information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 277-311, June.
    38. Sushil Bikhchandani, 1992. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 187-203.
    39. Khanna, Naveen & Sonti, Ramana, 2004. "Value creating stock manipulation: feedback effect of stock prices on firm value," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 237-270, June.
    40. Tor-Erik Bakke & Toni M. Whited, 2010. "Which Firms Follow the Market? An Analysis of Corporate Investment Decisions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 1941-1980.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, 2014. "Predatory Short Selling," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(6), pages 2153-2195.
    2. Peng, Juan & Huang, Wenli & Gao, Han & Wang, Hongli, 2022. "Modeling the unintended consequences of short selling for innovation investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Amelia Pais & Philip A. Stork, 2013. "Short-Selling, Leverage and Systemic Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-186/IV/DSF68, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Fos, Vyacheslav & Appel, Ian & Bulka, Jordan, 2019. "Active Short Selling by Hedge Funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 13788, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Corum, Adrian Aycan, 2021. "Fighting Fire with Fire: Optimality of Value Destruction to Mitigate Short-Termism," OSF Preprints xhwmg, Center for Open Science.
    6. Luo, Jinbo & Ni, Xiaoran & Tian, Gary Gang, 2020. "Short selling and corporate tax avoidance: Insights from a financial constraint view," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    7. Ni, Xiaoran & Yin, Sirui, 2020. "The unintended real effects of short selling in an emerging market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Ni, Xiaoran & Xu, Hongmei, 2023. "Are short selling threats beneficial to creditors? Insights from corporate default risk," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    9. Xia Chen & Qiang Cheng & Ting Luo & Heng Yue, 2020. "Short Sellers and Long‐Run Management Forecasts," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 802-828, June.
    10. Itay Goldstein, 2023. "Information in Financial Markets and Its Real Effects," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-32.
    11. Cetemen, D. & Cisternas, G. & Kolb, A. & Viswanathan, S., 2022. "Activist Manipulation Dynamics," Working Papers 22/04, Department of Economics, City University London.
    12. Alex Edmans, 2014. "Blockholders and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 23-50, December.
    13. Doruk Cetemen & Gonzalo Cisternas & Aaron Kolb & S Viswanathan, 2022. "Activist Trading Dynamics," Staff Reports 1030, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    14. Hui Ding & Xiaoran Ni & Hongmei Xu, 2021. "Short selling and labor investment efficiency: evidence from the Chinese stock market," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(S1), pages 2451-2476, April.
    15. Toni Ahnert & Caio Machado & Ana Elisa Pereira, 2020. "Trading for Bailouts," Staff Working Papers 20-23, Bank of Canada.
    16. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richmond Mathews & Naveen Khanna, 2010. "Bear Raids and Short Sale Bans: Is Government Intervention Justifiable?," 2010 Meeting Papers 165, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Brav, Alon & Mathews, Richmond D., 2011. "Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 289-307, February.
    4. Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2395-2428.
    5. Itay Goldstein, 2023. "Information in Financial Markets and Its Real Effects," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-32.
    6. Melissa Porras Prado & Pedro A. C. Saffi & Jason Sturgess, 2016. "Ownership Structure, Limits to Arbitrage, and Stock Returns: Evidence from Equity Lending Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3211-3244.
    7. Brogaard, Jonathan & Li, Dan & Xia, Ying, 2017. "Stock liquidity and default risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 486-502.
    8. Vladimirov, Vladimir & Terovitis, Spyros, 2020. "How Financial Markets Create Superstars," CEPR Discussion Papers 15546, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. repec:oup:revfin:v:29:y:2016:i:12:p:3211-3244. is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Philip Bond & Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein, 2012. "The Real Effects of Financial Markets," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 339-360, October.
    11. Alex Edmans, 2014. "Blockholders and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 23-50, December.
    12. Goldman, Eitan & Strobl, Günter, 2013. "Large shareholder trading and the complexity of corporate investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 106-122.
    13. Ee, Mong Shan & Hasan, Iftekhar & Huang, He, 2022. "Stock liquidity and corporate labor investment11We are grateful to the editor (Heitor Almeida) and an anynmous reviewer for detailed and significant guidance and suggestions. We thank Huu Duong, Alvin," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    14. Dasgupta, Amil & Brav, Alon & Mathews, Richmond, 2016. "Wolf Pack Activism," CEPR Discussion Papers 11507, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Konijn, Sander J.J. & Kräussl, Roman & Lucas, Andre, 2011. "Blockholder dispersion and firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1330-1339.
    16. Bai, Jennie & Philippon, Thomas & Savov, Alexi, 2016. "Have financial markets become more informative?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 625-654.
    17. Cheung, William Ming Yan & Im, Hyun Joong & Selvam, Srinivasan, 2023. "Stock liquidity and investment efficiency: Evidence from the split-share structure reform in China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    18. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, 2014. "Predatory Short Selling," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(6), pages 2153-2195.
    19. Heidi Quah & Janto Haman & Dharmendra Naidu, 2021. "The effect of stock liquidity on investment efficiency under financing constraints and asymmetric information: Evidence from the United States," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(S1), pages 2109-2150, April.
    20. Toni Ahnert & Caio Machado & Ana Elisa Pereira, 2020. "Trading for Bailouts," Staff Working Papers 20-23, Bank of Canada.
    21. Chang, Eric C. & Lin, Tse-Chun & Ma, Xiaorong, 2020. "Governance through trading on acquisitions of public firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Speculation; Short selling; Regulation; Manipulation; Bear raids;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:106:y:2012:i:2:p:229-246. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.