Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids
The announcement of a takeover bid causes significant increases in the target's stock price, but the possibility that a bid is motivated to cause this increase so that the bidder can sell his holdings has not been studied. We show that stock price manipulation lowers the prebid stock price. Furthermore, if there is little takeover activity, manipulation increases takeover bids and prevents some efficient takeovers. In this case, stockholders prefer to ban it. However, if there is a high level of takeover activity, serious bidders are better off and social surplus is increased by the possibility of manipulation. In this case, stockholders may oppose a ban.
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|Date of creation:||1989|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.|
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