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The effect of reference point prices on mergers and acquisitions

Listed author(s):
  • Baker, Malcolm
  • Pan, Xin
  • Wurgler, Jeffrey

Prior stock price peaks of targets affect several aspects of merger and acquisition activity. Offer prices are biased toward recent peak prices although they are economically unremarkable. An offer's probability of acceptance jumps discontinuously when it exceeds a peak price. Conversely, bidder shareholders react more negatively as the offer price is influenced upward toward a peak. Merger waves occur when high returns on the market and likely targets make it easier for bidders to offer a peak price. Parties thus appear to use recent peaks as reference points or anchors to simplify the complex tasks of valuation and negotiation.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X12000712
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 106 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 49-71

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:106:y:2012:i:1:p:49-71
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.04.010
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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  52. repec:hrv:faseco:30748164 is not listed on IDEAS
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