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Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud

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  • Hamilton, Stephen F.
  • Zilberman, David

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  • Hamilton, Stephen F. & Zilberman, David, 2006. "Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 627-644, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:52:y:2006:i:3:p:627-644
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Engel, Stefanie, 2004. "Achieving environmental goals in a world of trade and hidden action: the role of trade policies and eco-labeling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 1122-1145.
    2. Bonomo, Marco & Garcia, Rene, 1994. "Can a Well-Fitted Equilibrium Asset-Pricing Model Produce Mean Reversion?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., pages 19-29.
    3. William Novshek, 1985. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 85-98.
    4. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    5. Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham, 1995. "Duopoly and quality standards," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 71-82.
    6. Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1997. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 547-581.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and compliance strategies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 85-125, October.
    9. Amacher, Gregory S. & Koskela, Erkki & Ollikainen, Markku, 2004. "Environmental quality competition and eco-labeling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 284-306.
    10. William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Reputation and Product Quality," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 508-516, Autumn.
    11. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 490-504.
    12. Stephen K. Swallow & Roger A. Sedjo, 2000. "Eco-Labeling Consequences in General Equilibrium: A Graphical Assessment," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, pages 28-36.
    13. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    14. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 301-317.
    15. Malik, Arun S., 2002. "Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 371-390.
    16. Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, 1979. "Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 1-23.
    17. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Sunding, David L. & Zilberman, David, 2003. "Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 799-817.
    18. Roland Bénabou & Robert Gertner, 1993. "Search with Learning from Prices: Does Increased Inflationary Uncertainty Lead to Higher Markups?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 69-93.
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