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Anonymity in the dictator game revisited

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Listed author(s):
  • Franzen, Axel
  • Pointner, Sonja
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    Abstract

    Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268111002332
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 74-81

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:1:p:74-81
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.005
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

    Keywords: Other-regarding preferences; Fairness; Dictator game; Experimental game theory; Randomized response technique;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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    Cited by:

    1. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Tan, Jonathan H. W., 2014. "Would I Care if I Knew? Image Concerns and Social Confirmation in Giving," IZA Discussion Papers 8739, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Saima Naeem & Asad Zaman, 2014. "Gender and Ultimatum in Pakistan: Revisited," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 53(1), pages 1-14.
    3. Isabel Thielmann & Daniel W. Heck & Benjamin E. Hilbig, 2016. "Anonymity and incentives: An investigation of techniques to reduce socially desirable responding in the Trust Game," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 11(5), pages 527-536, September.
    4. Matteo M. Galizzi & Daniel Navarro Martinez, 2015. "On the external validity of social-preference games: A systematic lab-field study," Economics Working Papers 1462, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. repec:jdm:journl:v:12:y:2017:i:3:p:208-223 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Axel Franzen & Sonja Pointner, 2013. "The external validity of giving in the dictator game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(2), pages 155-169, June.
    7. Greiff, Matthias & Egbert, Henrik, 2016. "The Pay-What-You-Want Game and Laboratory Experiments," MPRA Paper 75222, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Tobias Regner, 2016. "Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: is it a preference or a constraint?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2016-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Nadine Chlaß & Peter G. Moffatt, 2017. "Giving in Dictator Games - Experimenter Demand Effect or Preference over the Rules of the Game?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-044, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Tobias Regner & Astrid Matthey, 2015. "Do reciprocators exploit or resist moral wiggle room? An experimental analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2015-027, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    11. Axel Franzen & Sonja Pointner, 2013. "Giving according to preferences: Decision-making in the group dictator game," University of Bern Social Sciences Working Papers 2, University of Bern, Department of Social Sciences, revised 24 Jan 2014.
    12. Keuschnigg, Marc & Wolbring, Tobias, 2014. "Disorder, Social Capital, and Norm Violation: Three Field Experiments on the Broken Windows Thesis," MPRA Paper 57534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Gasiorowska, Agata, 2012. "Psychologiczne skutki aktywacji idei pieniędzy a obdarowywanie bliskich
      [The psychological consequences of mere exposure to money and gift-giving]      ," MPRA Paper 48170, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Ulf Liebe & Veronika A. Andorfer & Patricia A. Gwartney & Jürgen Meyerhoff, 2014. "Ethical Consumption and Social Context: Experimental Evidence from Germany and the United States," University of Bern Social Sciences Working Papers 7, University of Bern, Department of Social Sciences.

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