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Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change

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  • Twight, Charlotte

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  • Twight, Charlotte, 1996. "Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 299-333, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:31:y:1996:i:3:p:299-333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-850.
    3. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    4. John R. Lott, Jr., 1987. "Why Is Education Publicly Provided? A Critical Survey," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 7(2), pages 475-501, Fall.
    5. Crew, Michael A & Twight, Charlotte, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 15-36, July.
    6. Kuran, Timur, 1987. "Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 642-665, September.
    7. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    8. Charlotte Twight, 1994. "Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 189-216, April.
    9. Klein, Daniel B., 1994. "If Government is so Villainous, How come Government Officials don't seem like Villains?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(01), pages 91-106, April.
    10. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    11. Charlotte Twight, 1992. "Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 89-112, December.
    12. Charlotte Twight, 1988. "Government manipulation of constitutional-level transaction costs: A general theory of transaction-cost augmentation and the growth of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 131-152, February.
    13. Twight, Charlotte, 1991. "From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame: The Evolution of Congressional Strategy for Asbestos Management," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 153-186, April.
    14. Carolyn L. Weaver, 1983. "The Economics and Politics of the Emergence of Social Security: Some Implications for Reform.," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 3(2), pages 361-391, Fall.
    15. Higgs, Robert, 1985. "Crisis, bigger government, and ideological change: Two hypotheses on the ratchet phenomenon," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-28, January.
    16. repec:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:01:p:85-104_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Twight, Charlotte, 1993. "Channeling Ideological Change: The Political Economy of Dependence on Government," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 497-527.
    18. repec:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:01:p:243-245_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. E. West & Stanley Winer, 1980. "Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 607-622, January.
    20. repec:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:03:p:897-918_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    22. Lott, John R, Jr, 1990. "An Explanation for Public Provision of Schooling: The Importance of Indoctrination," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 199-231, April.
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