A re-examination of the Fiorina-Plott and Eavey voting experiments: How much do cardinal payoffs influence outcomes?
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- Gary S. Becker, 1984.
"Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
- Salant, S.W. & Goodstein, E., 1989.
"Predicting Committee Behavior In Majority-Rule Voting Experiments,"
89-25, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Stephen W. Salant & Eban Goodstein, 1990. "Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(2), pages 293-313, Summer.
- Koford, Kenneth, 1993. " The Median and the Competitive Equilibrium in One Dimension," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 273-88, July.
- Elizabeth Hoffman & Charles Plott, 1983.
"Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees,"
Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 21-39, January.
- Hoffman, Elizabeth & Plott, Charles R., . "Pre-meeting Discussions and the Possibility of Coalition-Breaking Procedures in Majority Rule Committees," Working Papers 281, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
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