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Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks

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Abstract

The history of the world is strewn with the remains of societies whose institutions failed to adapt to ecological change, but the determinants of institutional fragility are difficult to identify in the historical record. We report a laboratory experiment that explores the impact of an exogenous ecological shock on the informal rules of property and exchange. We find that geographically induced tribal sentiments, which are unobservable in the historical record, impede adaptation post-shock and that inequality declines as wealth and sociableness increase. Quantitative measures of individual and group sociality account for some of the differences in successful or failed adaptation.

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  • Erik O. Kimbrough & Bart J. Wilson, 2012. "Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks," Discussion Papers dp12-20, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    • Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp12-20
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    Cited by:

    1. Karolina Safarzynska, 2018. "The Impact of Resource Uncertainty and Intergroup Conflict on Harvesting in the Common-Pool Resource Experiment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(4), pages 1001-1025, December.
    2. Taylor Jaworski & Bart J. Wilson, 2013. "Go West Young Man: Self‐Selection and Endogenous Property Rights," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 79(4), pages 886-904, April.
    3. Bart Wilson, 2015. "Further towards a theory of the emergence of property," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 201-222, April.
    4. Kotsakou, Stamatina & Walters, Cory & Banerjee, Simanti, 2016. "Successful Extension Meetings and Innovative Economic Research: Grain Marketing Simulations," Cornhusker Economics 306947, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    5. Marco A. Janssen & Therese Lindahl & James J. Murphy, 2015. "Advancing the Understanding of Behavior in Social-Ecological Systems: Results from Lab and Field Experiments," Working Papers 2015-05, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experimental Economics; Rules; Ecological Shocks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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