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A Model of Market and Political Power Interactions for Southern Europe

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  • Kollintzas, Tryphon
  • Papageorgiou, Dimitris
  • Vassilatos, Vanghelis

Abstract

In recent years the growth pattern of most Southern European countries has been disturbed, as those countries are suffering from economic crises that go beyond the usual business cycle. In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of market and political power interactions that explains this growth reversal. Moreover, the model is consistent with several stylized facts of those countries, where wages in the public sector relative to the private sector are high and these wage differentials correlate negatively with public sector employment over total employment, total factor productivity, and output growth. The model is a synthesis of the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government. Outsiders form a group of workers that supply labor to a competitive private sector. And, insiders form a group of workers that enjoy market power in supplying labor to the public sector and influence the policy decisions of government, including those that affect the development and maintenance of public sector infrastructures.

Suggested Citation

  • Kollintzas, Tryphon & Papageorgiou, Dimitris & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2015. "A Model of Market and Political Power Interactions for Southern Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 10359, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba & Javier Pérez & José Torres, 2012. "Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 309-326, January.
    2. Angeletos, George-Marios & Kollintzas, Tryphon, 2000. "Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    4. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, January.
    7. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    8. Olivier Blanchard, 2004. "The Economic Future of Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 3-26, Fall.
    9. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Special Interest Politics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262571676, January.
    10. Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, 2001. "Insiders versus Outsiders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 165-188, Winter.
    11. Parente, Stephen L & Prescott, Edward C, 1994. "Barriers to Technology Adoption and Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 298-321, April.
    12. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-239, May.
    13. Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, 2004. "New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 779-816, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Javier J. Pérez & Marie Aouriri & Maria M. Campos & Dmitrij Celov & Domenico Depalo & Evangelia Papapetrou & Jurga Pesliakaite & Roberto Ramos Magdaleno & Marta Rodríguez-Vives, 2016. "The fiscal and macroeconomic effects of government wages and employment reform," Occasional Papers 1607, Banco de España;Occasional Papers Homepage.
    2. repec:spr:izalpo:v:6:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1186_s40173-017-0086-0 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Maria M. Campos & Domenico Depalo & Evangelia Papapetrou & Javier J. Pérez & Roberto Ramos, 2017. "Understanding the public sector pay gap," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-29, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Growth; Insiders - Outsiders; Politicoeconomic Equilibrium; Public Sector Wage Premium; Southern European Economies;

    JEL classification:

    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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