IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2464.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model

Author

Listed:
  • Angeletos, George-Marios
  • Kollintzas, Tryphon

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth context. We develop an endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs, as intermediate-good producers, may engage in rent-seeking activities. The latter are defined by the following properties: (i) their internal effect is positive; (ii) their external effect is negative; and (iii) they use real resources. Our formulation may be viewed as a parable for theft and fraud; organized crime; industrial espionage; lobbying and policy influence; misgovernance, institutional inefficiency, tax evasion, etc. The economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth. Agents' perceptions about the external effects of rent seeking, and the complementarity or substitutability of intermediate inputs, are crucial. Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher returns to capital and more competition can be detrimental for welfare and growth, as they induce more rent seeking/corruption. Finally, our paradigm yields insights into the relationship of R&D, politicoeconomic equilibrium, income distribution, and growth, as well as the design of tax/growth policies in the presence of rent seeking/corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Angeletos, George-Marios & Kollintzas, Tryphon, 2000. "Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2464
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2464
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2005. "Fairness and Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 960-980, September.
    2. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2007. "Efficiency of Institutions, Political Stability and Income Dynamics," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(1), pages 6-30, February.
    3. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Papageorgiou, Dimitris & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2015. "A Model of Market and Political Power Interactions for Southern Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 10359, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Papageorgiou, Dimitris & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2013. "A Neoclassical Growth Model for the Insiders – Outsiders Society," CEPR Discussion Papers 9640, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Charles Leung & Sam Tang & Nicolaas Groenewold, 2006. "Growth Volatility and Technical Progress: A Simple Rent-seeking Model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 159-178, August.
    6. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1983, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    7. Gaitan, Beatriz & Pavel, Ferdinand, 2001. "How To Consider Governance In Economic Policy Modeling?," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20566, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Tryphon Kollintzas & Dimitris Papageorgiou & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2016. "Market and Political Power Interactions in Greece: A Theory," Working Papers 201601, Athens University Of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Growth; Property Rights; Rent Seeking;

    JEL classification:

    • E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.