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Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Alesina
  • George-Marios Angeletos

Abstract

Different beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income inequality, influence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But the composition of income in the first place depends on equilibrium tax policies. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will chose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium effort will be high, the role of luck limited, market outcomes will be quite fair, and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If instead a society believes that luck, birth, connections and/or corruption determine wealth, it will tax a lot, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. We show how this interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equilibria or multiple steady states. We argue that this model can contribute to explain US vis a vis continental European perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fairness and Redistribution: US versus Europe," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1983, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1983
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    File URL: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2002/HIER1983.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Audi & Amjad Ali, 2019. "Exploring the Linkage between Corruption and Economic Development in The Case of Selected Developing and Developed Nations," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 9(4), pages 37-49.
    2. Tyran, Jean-Robert & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2006. "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 469-485, February.
    3. Grogger, Jeffrey & Hanson, Gordon H., 2011. "Income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 42-57, May.
    4. Bilal El Rafhi & Alexandre Volle, 2020. "The Effect of the Arab Spring on Preferences for Redistribution in Egypt," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 66(4), pages 875-903, December.
    5. Gordon, Robert J. & Dew-Becker, Ian, 2008. "Controversies about the Rise in American Inequality: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6817, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. repec:pri:wwseco:dp226 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Alesina, Alberto & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2005. "Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 897-931, June.
    8. Di Tella, Rafael & MacCulloch, Robert, 2006. "Europe vs America: Institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(12), pages 2161-2186, December.
    9. Fischer, Justina AV, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Social Mobility: An Analysis for OECD countries," MPRA Paper 17070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2007. "Poverty traps: a perspective from development economics," Working Papers hal-04139210, HAL.
    11. Alicia Georghiades & Francisco José Eiroa-Orosa, 2020. "A Randomised Enquiry on the Interaction Between Wellbeing and Citizenship," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 21(6), pages 2115-2139, August.
    12. Christina Fong, 2003. "Emphatic responsiveness: Evidence from a randomized experiment on giving to welfare recipients," Framed Field Experiments 00149, The Field Experiments Website.
    13. Richard M. Bird, 2008. "Tax Challenges Facing Developing Countries," Working Papers id:1618, eSocialSciences.
    14. Claudia Senik, 2005. "Income distribution and well‐being: what can we learn from subjective data?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 43-63, February.
    15. Claudia Senik, 2008. "Ambition and Jealousy: Income Interactions in the ‘Old’ Europe versus the ‘New’ Europe and the United States," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 495-513, August.
    16. Frederick Van der Ploeg, 2004. "The Welfare State, Redistribution and the Economy, Reciprocal Altruism, Consumer Rivalry and Second Best," CESifo Working Paper Series 1234, CESifo.
    17. Bjørnskov, Christian, 2004. "Legal Quality, Inequality, and Tolerance," Working Papers 04-9, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    18. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Inequality and Political Consensus," CEPR Discussion Papers 4159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Richard M. Bird & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2014. "Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 301-351, May.
    20. Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2009. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 40(1 (Spring), pages 285-332.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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