How To Consider Governance In Economic Policy Modeling?
We develop a framework where economic agents choose between becoming productive entrepreneurs or re-distributive rent seekers. Rent seekers use economic resources to extract rents and thus their existence generates an inefficient economic outcome. We study the welfare impact of rent seeking activities and show that their reduction is welfare improving.
|Date of creation:||2001|
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- Baldwin, Richard E, 1992.
"Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 162-174, February.
- Richard Baldwin, 1989. "Measureable Dynamic Gains from Trade," NBER Working Papers 3147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baldwin, Richard, 1990. "Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade," Working Paper Series 270, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Angeletos, George-Marios & Kollintzas, Tryphon, 2000. "Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 2464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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