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Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision

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  • Charlotte Twight

Abstract

In a post-constitutional context, restructuring of constitutional rights often fundamentally alters the role and scope of government. It is therefore important to assess the extent to which consensuality is likely to characterize the process of constitutional revision. This article provides theoretical and empirical grounds for concluding that nonconsensual constitutional revision is often the rule rather than the exception. The endogeneity of politically relevant transaction costs and their manipulation by self-interested political actors in a post-constitutional environment are central to the analysis. Copyright George Mason University 1992

Suggested Citation

  • Charlotte Twight, 1992. "Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 89-112, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:1:p:89-112
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393234
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    1. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
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    12. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-224, May.
    2. Charlotte Twight, 1994. "Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 189-216, April.
    3. Twight, Charlotte, 1996. "Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 299-333, December.

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