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If Government is so Villainous, How come Government Officials don't seem like Villains?

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  • Klein, Daniel B.

Abstract

At lunch one day a colleague and I had a friendly argument over occupational licensing. I attacked it for being anticompetitive, arguing that licensing boards raise occupational incomes by restricting entry, advertising, and commercialization. My colleague, while acknowledging anticompetitive aspects, affirmed the need for licensing on the grounds of protecting the consumer from frauds and quacks. In many areas of infrequent and specialized dealing, consumers are not able, ex ante or even ex post, to evaluate competence. I countered by suggesting voluntary means by which reputational problems might be handled and by returning to the offensive. I said that in fact the impetus for licensing usually comes from the practitioners, not their customers, and that licensing boards seldom devote their time to ferreting out incompetence but rather simply to prosecuting unlicensed practitioners. I mentioned cross-sectional findings, such as those on state licensure, prices, and occupational incomes. Overall, I characterized the professional establishment as a group of dastardly operators, who set the standards, write the codes, and enforce behavior to enhance their own material wellbeing - in brief, as venal rent-seekers.

Suggested Citation

  • Klein, Daniel B., 1994. "If Government is so Villainous, How come Government Officials don't seem like Villains?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 91-106, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:10:y:1994:i:01:p:91-106_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Sutter, 1997. "Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 139-150, June.
    2. Niclas Berggren, 2000. "Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 353-369, December.
    3. Thomas Mayer, "undated". "Monetarists And Keynesians On Central Banking: A Study Of A Failed Debate," Department of Economics 96-06, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    4. Daniel B. Klein, 2004. "Statist Quo Bias," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(2), pages 260-271, August.
    5. Bryan Caplan, 2006. "The Economics of Szasz," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(3), pages 333-366, August.
    6. Karl Widerquist, 2003. "Public Choice and Altruism," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 317-337, Summer.
    7. Twight, Charlotte, 1996. "Federal control over education: Crisis, deception, and institutional change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 299-333, December.
    8. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2004. "The Political Economy of the Dynamic Nature of Government Intervention: An Introduction to Potentials and Problems," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 3-20, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    9. Niclas Berggren, 2012. "Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(3), pages 199-221, September.
    10. Tyler Cowen, 2005. "Self-deception as the root of political failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 437-451, September.
    11. Berggren, Niclas, 2003. "The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons," Ratio Working Papers 1, The Ratio Institute.
    12. Eli Dourado & Alex Tabarrok, 2015. "Public choice perspectives on intellectual property," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 129-151, April.

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