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Is there a winner's curse in the labor market?

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  • Perri, Timothy J.

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  • Perri, Timothy J., 1995. "Is there a winner's curse in the labor market?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 79-89, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:28:y:1995:i:1:p:79-89
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
    2. Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, 1987. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-476.
    3. Perri, Timothy J., 1995. "The invisibility hypothesis and promotion efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 337-340, June.
    4. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "Specific Capital, Bargaining, and Labor Turnover," Discussion Papers 320, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    6. Bruce C. Greenwald, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 325-347.
    7. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 572-586, Autumn.
    8. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: The Winner's Curse," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 191-202, Winter.
    9. Perri, T. J., 1995. "Testing for ability when job assignment is a signal," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 106-107, March.
    10. Prendergast, Canice, 1992. "The Insurance Effect of Groups," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 567-581, August.
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    1. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    2. James J. Chrisman & Esra Memili & Kaustav Misra, 2014. "Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 38(5), pages 1-25, September.
    3. Kiyotaki, Fumi, 2010. "Hold-up and the inefficiency of job assignments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 36-44, March.
    4. Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph, 2017. "Human Capital Flows in Failing Organizations: An Integrated Conceptual Framework," MPRA Paper 80781, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. James V. Koch & Richard J. Cebula, 2002. "Price, Quality, And Service On The Internet: Sense And Nonsense," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(1), pages 25-37, January.
    6. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 2006. "Selective Counteroffers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 385-410, July.
    7. Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph, 2020. "Talent Management and Global Competition for Top Talent: A Co-Opetition-Based Perspective," MPRA Paper 101113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2005. "Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries," Working Papers 05006, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
    9. Simon Dato & Andreas Grunewald & Matthias Kräkel, 2021. "Worker visibility and firms' retention policies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 168-202, February.
    10. Curt B. Moore & G. Tyge Payne & Igor Filatotchev & Edward J. Zajac, 2019. "The Cost of Status: When Social and Economic Interests Collide," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(5), pages 869-884, September.
    11. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2013. "A Theory of Worker Turnover and Knowledge Transfer in High-Technology Industries," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(2), pages 107-129.

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