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Bargaining on behalf of others: Incentives, beliefs, and gender gaps

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  • Kenney, Jeanna
  • Mangoubi, Tomer

Abstract

Oftentimes people delegate negotiation to others (i.e., “agents”), whether formally or informally. This paper explores the impact of agents on gender differences in negotiation and how this varies with common incentive structures. Using a bargaining experiment with over 2,400 subjects, we find that, absent agents, males make more aggressive demands than females. Introducing agents who negotiate on behalf of the players entirely closes this gap. Although agent incentives affect overall aggressiveness, they do not induce gender gaps. Belief elicitations suggest that this is because agents underestimate reservation prices for both males and females and incorrectly believe that they have the same threshold for rewarding aggressive behavior. While males and females have similar expected outcomes, agents close a risk exposure gap by making proposals across genders that are equally likely to be accepted.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenney, Jeanna & Mangoubi, Tomer, 2025. "Bargaining on behalf of others: Incentives, beliefs, and gender gaps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:238:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125003403
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107221
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