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Social norms offer explanation for inconsistent effects of incentives on prosocial behavior

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  • Graf, Caroline
  • Suanet, Bianca
  • Wiepking, Pamala
  • Merz, Eva-Maria

Abstract

Humans are widely considered to be susceptible to incentives, which are frequently employed to encourage specific behaviors. However, incentives have surprisingly inconsistent effects when used to motivate prosocial behavior – sometimes producing no behavioral change or even backfiring. To explain these inconsistencies, we extended a prominent image-based model of prosocial behavior, based on the idea that social norms shape the reputational consequences of receiving incentives. We tested the key predictions of this model by examining the blood donation behavior of 26,000 individuals from 28 European countries. Our preregistered analyses revealed that social norms can indeed predict how incentives, either in the form of financial payments or time off work, relate to individual-level blood donation behavior. Incentives are associated with higher levels of prosociality if they align with existing norms. The results suggest that humans may not be universally persuaded by incentives to behave prosocially, but that the effectiveness of incentives depends on social norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Graf, Caroline & Suanet, Bianca & Wiepking, Pamala & Merz, Eva-Maria, 2023. "Social norms offer explanation for inconsistent effects of incentives on prosocial behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 429-441.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:211:y:2023:i:c:p:429-441
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Columbus & Lars P. Feld & Matthias Kasper & Matthew D. Rablen, 2023. "Behavioural Responses to Unfair Institutions: Experimental Evidence on Rule Compliance, Norm Polarisation, and Trust," CESifo Working Paper Series 10591, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prosocial behavior; Social norms; Incentives; Blood donation; Cross-cultural study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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