IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v171y2020icp77-95.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Antinyan, Armenak
  • Corazzini, Luca
  • Pavesi, Filippo

Abstract

Whistleblowing is a powerful tool that the tax authorities of various countries use to curb tax evasion. Nonetheless, the determinants shaping one's positive attitude toward whistleblowing are rather understudied. We investigate the relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders. Potential whistleblowers may distrust the government either because they doubt that it will operate efficiently (avoiding to waste tax revenue) and fairly (treating all taxpayers equally), or because they fear that their anonymity may not be preserved. We focus on the relationship between the former channel of distrust and the attitude toward whistleblowing, and our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we provide motivating evidence from a unique national household survey administered in the Republic of Armenia. We then present results from a large-scale survey experiment in the USA that provides causal evidence in support of the investigated relationship. Our main finding is that a more trustworthy government exerts a positive effect on citizens’ attitude toward whistleblowing.

Suggested Citation

  • Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & Pavesi, Filippo, 2020. "Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 77-95.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:171:y:2020:i:c:p:77-95
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268120300147
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.014?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buckenmaier, Johannes & Dimant, Eugen & Mittone, Luigi, 2020. "Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 296-313.
    2. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
    3. Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007. "Blowing the Whistle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April.
    4. Jeffrey V. Butler & Danila Serra & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Motivating Whistleblowers," Departmental Working Papers 1701, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    5. Ilyana Kuziemko & Michael I. Norton & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2015. "How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1478-1508, April.
    6. Pingle, Mark & Mitchell, Mike, 2002. "What motivates positional concerns for income?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 127-148, February.
    7. P. Cassematis & R. Wortley, 2013. "Prediction of Whistleblowing or Non-reporting Observation: The Role of Personal and Situational Factors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 117(3), pages 615-634, October.
    8. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2020. "Whistleblower protection: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    9. repec:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:225-33 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Bartuli, Jenny & Djawadi, Behnud Mir & Fahr, René, 2016. "Business Ethics in Organizations: An Experimental Examination of Whistleblowing and Personality," IZA Discussion Papers 10190, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Wahl, Ingrid, 2008. "Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 210-225, April.
    12. Krueger, Alan B. & Kuziemko, Ilyana, 2013. "The demand for health insurance among uninsured Americans: Results of a survey experiment and implications for policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 780-793.
    13. Castro, Lucio & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-82.
    14. Torgler, Benno, 2003. "To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 283-302, July.
    15. Orviska, Marta & Hudson, John, 2003. "Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 83-102, March.
    16. Abbink, Klaus & Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Jain, Tarun, 2014. "Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 17-28.
    17. Cruces, Guillermo & Perez-Truglia, Ricardo & Tetaz, Martin, 2013. "Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 100-112.
    18. Philipp Lergetporer & Guido Schwerdt & Katharina Werner & Ludger Woessmann, 2016. "Information and Preferences for Public Spending: Evidence from Representative Survey Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 5938, CESifo.
    19. Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika & Horváth, Gergely & Nitta, Kohei, 2019. "Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 287-301.
    20. Alpizar, Francisco & Carlsson, Fredrik & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2005. "How much do we care about absolute versus relative income and consumption?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 405-421, March.
    21. Webley, Paul & Cole, Michaela & Eidjar, Ole-Petter, 2001. "The prediction of self-reported and hypothetical tax-evasion: Evidence from England, France and Norway," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 141-155, April.
    22. Viola Angelini & Marco Bertoni & Luca Corazzini, 2017. "Unpacking the determinants of life satisfaction: a survey experiment," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 180(1), pages 225-246, January.
    23. Faravelli, Marco, 2007. "How context matters: A survey based experiment on distributive justice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1399-1422, August.
    24. Fredrik Carlsson & Olof Johansson‐Stenman & Peter Martinsson, 2007. "Do You Enjoy Having More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 586-598, November.
    25. Reuben, Ernesto & Stephenson, Matt, 2013. "Nobody likes a rat: On the willingness to report lies and the consequences thereof," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 384-391.
    26. Philipp Doerrenberg & Jan Schmitz, 2017. "Tax compliance and information provision. A field experiment with small firms," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 1(1), pages 47-54, February.
    27. Porcano, Thomas M., 1988. "Correlates of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 47-67, March.
    28. Cummings, Ronald G. & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McKee, Michael & Torgler, Benno, 2009. "Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 447-457, June.
    29. V. Umashanker Trivedi & Mohamed Shehata & Stuart Mestelman, 2004. "Attitudes, Incentives, and Tax Compliance," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 2004-04, McMaster University.
    30. Mr. David A. Grigorian & Mr. Hamid R Davoodi, 2007. "Tax Potential vs. Tax Effort: A Cross-Country Analysis of Armenia's Stubbornly Low Tax Collection," IMF Working Papers 2007/106, International Monetary Fund.
    31. Giulia Mascagni, 2018. "From The Lab To The Field: A Review Of Tax Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 273-301, April.
    32. Sheppard, Blair H & Hartwick, Jon & Warshaw, Paul R, 1988. "The Theory of Reasoned Action: A Meta-analysis of Past Research with Recommendations for Modifications and Future Research," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 15(3), pages 325-343, December.
    33. Wenzel, Michael, 2005. "Misperceptions of social norms about tax compliance: From theory to intervention," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 862-883, December.
    34. Marreiros, Helia & Tonin, Mirco & Vlassopoulos, Michael & Schraefel, M.C., 2017. "“Now that you mention it”: A survey experiment on information, inattention and online privacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 1-17.
    35. Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Luigi Mittone, 2016. "Tax Evasion and Institutions. An Experiment on The Role of Principal Witness Regulations," PPE Working Papers 0007, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    36. Wallschutzky, I. G., 1984. "Possible causes of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 371-384, December.
    37. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander, 2014. "Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 317-336.
    38. Gideon Yaniv, 2001. "Revenge, Tax Informing, and the Optimal Bounty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 225-233, April.
    39. Christoph Kogler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2015. "Testing the “slippery slope framework” among self-employed taxpayers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 125-142, May.
    40. Schmolke, Klaus Ulrich & Utikal, Verena, 2016. "Whistleblowing: Incentives and situational determinants," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 09/2016, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics, revised 2016.
    41. Wahlund, Richard, 1992. "Tax changes and economic behavior: The case of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 657-677, December.
    42. Groenland, Edward A. G. & van Veldhoven, Gery M., 1983. "Tax evasion behavior: A psychological framework," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 129-144, June.
    43. Olof Johansson-Stenman & Fredrik Carlsson & Dinky Daruvala, 2002. "Measuring Future Grandparents" Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 362-383, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Adamu Jibir & Musa Abdu & Tasiu Muhammad, 2020. "Analysis of Tax Compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Firm-Level Study," Econometric Research in Finance, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, vol. 5(2), pages 119-142, December.
    2. Philipp Chapkovski & Luca Corazzini & Valeria Maggian, 2021. "Does Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders Reduce Ingroup Cooperation?," Working Papers 2021:20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Rustam Romaniuc & Dimitri Dubois & Eugen Dimant & Adrian Lupusor & Valeriu Prohnitchi, 2022. "Understanding cross-cultural differences in peer reporting practices: evidence from tax evasion games in Moldova and France," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 127-147, January.
    4. Armenak Antinyan & Thomas Bassetti & Luca Corazzini & Filippo Pavesi, 2020. "Trust in the Healthcare System and COVID-19 Treatment in the Developing World. Survey and Experimental Evidence from Armenia," Working Papers 2020:10, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Armenak Antinyan & Luca Corazzini & Filippo Pavesi, 2018. "What Matters for Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders? Survey and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 07/2018, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    2. Buckenmaier, Johannes & Dimant, Eugen & Mittone, Luigi, 2020. "Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 296-313.
    3. Kirchler, Erich & Niemirowski, Apolonia & Wearing, Alexander, 2006. "Shared subjective views, intent to cooperate and tax compliance: Similarities between Australian taxpayers and tax officers," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 502-517, August.
    4. Jeffrey V. Butler & Danila Serra & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Motivating Whistleblowers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2), pages 605-621, February.
    5. Colin C. Williams, 2023. "A Modern Guide to the Informal Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18668.
    6. Masclet, David & Montmarquette, Claude & Viennot-Briot, Nathalie, 2019. "Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    7. Nathalie Etchart-vincent & Marisa Ratto & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2024. "Why should I comply with taxes if others don't?: an experimental study testing informational effects," Working Papers hal-04635966, HAL.
    8. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    9. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2020. "Whistleblower protection: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    10. Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2011. "Tax Morale, Tax Evasion and the Shadow Economy," Chapters, in: Friedrich Schneider (ed.), Handbook on the Shadow Economy, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Wahl, Ingrid, 2008. "Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 210-225, April.
    13. Alpaslan Akay & Gökhan Karabulut & Peter Martinsson, 2013. "The effect of religiosity and religious festivals on positional concerns -- an experimental investigation of Ramadan," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(27), pages 3914-3921, September.
    14. Adriana AnaMaria Davidescu & Eduard Mihai Manta & Adina Teodora Stoica-Ungureanu & Magdalena Anton (Musat), 2022. "Could Religiosity and Religion Influence the Tax Morale of Individuals? An Empirical Analysis Based on Variable Selection Methods," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(23), pages 1-32, November.
    15. Nordblom, Katarina, 2017. "Tax Morale and Policy Intervention," Working Papers in Economics 711, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    16. repec:idq:ictduk:13726 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Cãƒtãƒlina Cozmei, 2012. "Playing The Fiscal Lottery Game," Proceedings of the INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 6(1), pages 511-521, November.
    18. Dina Pomeranz & José Vila-Belda, 2019. "Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 755-781, August.
    19. Philipp Doerrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2022. "Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity - Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 44-86.
    20. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2009. "Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation when both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter," Umeå Economic Studies 774, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    21. Thomas Aronsson & Olof Johansson‐Stenman & Tomas Sjögren, 2019. "Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(4), pages 1500-1532, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government trust; Whistleblowing; Tax evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:171:y:2020:i:c:p:77-95. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.