Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment
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DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.010
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Cited by:
- Behnk, Sascha & Hao, Li & Reuben, Ernesto, 2022. "Shifting normative beliefs: On why groups behave more antisocially than individuals," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
- Olayinka Erin & Omololu Adex Bamigboye, 2020. "Does whistleblowing framework influence earnings management? An empirical investigation," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(2), pages 111-122, September.
- Castillo, Geoffrey & Choo, Lawrence & Grimm, Veronika, 2022.
"Are groups always more dishonest than individuals? The case of salient negative externalities,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 198(C), pages 598-611.
- Geoffrey Castillo & Lawrence Choo & Veronika Grimm, 2022. "Are groups always more dishonest than individuals? The case of salient negative externalities," Post-Print hal-03900809, HAL.
- Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2020. "Expressive Voting vs. Self-Serving Ignorance," Working Papers 2020-33, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Guerra, Alice & Zhuravleva, Tatyana, 2021. "Do bystanders react to bribery?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 442-462.
- Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & Pavesi, Filippo, 2020. "Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 77-95.
- Sebastian Krügel & Matthias Uhl, 2023. "Internal whistleblowing systems without proper sanctions may backfire," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(8), pages 1355-1383, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
Whistleblowing; Diffusion of responsibility; Pro-social behaviours;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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