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Your misfortune is also mine: Land expropriation, property rights insecurity, and household behaviors in rural China

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  • Cheng, Mingda
  • Du, Julan
  • Ye, Chunhui
  • Zhang, Qi

Abstract

Using a unique nationwide survey of rural China, we examine the effects of property rights insecurity (PRI) created by undercompensated land requisitions (ULRs). To preclude the confounding impact of land losses on the behavior of displaced households, we adopt a novel approach comparing unaffected households in counties with massive ULRs and their counterparts in land-requisitioned counties without widespread ULRs, adjusted by their respective control group households in adjacent non-land-requisitioned counties. The group from counties with widespread ULRs exhibits significantly lower trust in local governments, employs risk-proof strategies to cope with perceived PRI, and experiences a decline in farming efficiency and household welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheng, Mingda & Du, Julan & Ye, Chunhui & Zhang, Qi, 2022. "Your misfortune is also mine: Land expropriation, property rights insecurity, and household behaviors in rural China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1068-1086.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:50:y:2022:i:4:p:1068-1086
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2022.06.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dai, Li & Martins, Pedro S., 2024. "Does vocational education pay off in China? Evidence from city-level education supply shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land expropriation; Property rights insecurity; Trust in local governments; Household risk-proof strategies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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