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The wonder-clause

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  • Gelpern, Anna
  • Gulati, Mitu

Abstract

The Greek debt crisis prompted EU officials to embark on a radical reconstruction of the European sovereign debt markets. Prominently featured in this reconstruction was a set of contract provisions called Collective Action Clauses, or CACs. CACs are supposed to help governments and private creditors to renegotiate unsustainable debt contracts, and obviate the need for EU bailouts. But European sovereign debt contacts were already amenable to restructuring; adding CACs could make it harder. Why, then, promote CACs at all, and cast them in such a central role in the market reform initiative? Using interviews with participants in the initiative and those affected by it, as well as observations at policy and academic meetings, we attempt to shed light on the puzzle and draw implications for the role of contract techniques in market construction.

Suggested Citation

  • Gelpern, Anna & Gulati, Mitu, 2013. "The wonder-clause," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 367-385.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:367-385
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.03.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andritzky, Jochen & Christofzik, Désirée I. & Feld, Lars P. & Scheuering, Uwe, 2016. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," Working Papers 04/2016, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    2. Bradley, Michael & De Lira Salvatierra, Irving & Gulati, Mitu, 2014. "Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the sovereign debt market?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(S), pages 150-168.
    3. Pistor, Katharina, 2013. "Law in Finance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 311-314.
    4. Pistor, Katharina, 2013. "A legal theory of finance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 315-330.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal theory of finance; Eurozone; Sovereign debt; Collective action clauses;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • P43 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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