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A theory of quality signaling in the marriage market

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  • Anderson, David A.
  • Hamori, Shigeyuki

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  • Anderson, David A. & Hamori, Shigeyuki, 2000. "A theory of quality signaling in the marriage market," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 229-242, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:229-242
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pollak, Robert A, 1977. "Price Dependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 64-75, March.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    5. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-454, June.
    6. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    7. Becker, Gary S, 1985. "Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 33-58, January.
    8. Boulier, Bryan L & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1984. "Schooling, Search, and Spouse Selection: Testing Economic Theories of Marriage and Household Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(4), pages 712-732, August.
    9. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    10. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    11. Hutchens, Robert M, 1979. "Welfare, Remarriage, and Marital Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 369-379, June.
    12. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    13. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Vaillant, 2004. "Discrimination in matchmaking: evidence from the price policy of a French marriage bureau," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 723-729.
    2. Vaillant, Nicolas G. & Harrant, Valérie, 2008. "Determinants of the likelihood of finding the right partner in an arranged marriage: Evidence from a French matchmaking agency," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 657-671, April.
    3. Vaillant, Nicolas G., 2004. "Estimating the time elapsed between ending a relationship and joining a matchmaking agency: Evidence from a French marriage bureau," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 789-802, December.

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