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Economic consequences of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators

Author

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  • Balakrishnan, Karthik
  • De George, Emmanuel T.
  • Ertan, Aytekin
  • Scobie, Hannah

Abstract

We study the economic consequences of mandates that require bank auditors to report to bank regulators. Based on survey responses from the European Central Bank, all 28 national bank regulators within the European Union, and a review of national banking regulations, we create a novel dataset on these mandates. Exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series variation in these mandates, we find evidence that auditor reporting to bank regulators reduces bank riskiness, as measured by counterparty risk and credit spreads. We also observe a decline in problem loans and risk-weighted assets, as well as improvements in timeliness of loan loss provisions. Additional analyses suggest that mandated auditor reporting increases the effectiveness of supervisory and monitoring efforts and improves market discipline of banks. However, mandated auditor reporting comes with costs: it reduces future lending growth, risky lending, and profitability, and increases audit fees paid by shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Balakrishnan, Karthik & De George, Emmanuel T. & Ertan, Aytekin & Scobie, Hannah, 2021. "Economic consequences of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:72:y:2021:i:2:s016541012100046x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101431
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    Cited by:

    1. Amel-Zadeh, Amir & Barth, Mary E., 2021. "Auditor reporting to bank regulators: Effective regulation or regulatory overreach?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2).
    2. Das, Abhiman & Mohapatra, Sanket & Nigania, Akshita, 2022. "State-owned banks and credit allocation in India: Evidence from an asset quality review," IIMA Working Papers WP 2022-02-01, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
    3. Wang, Jiaxin & Huang, Xiang & Gu, Qiankun & Song, Zilong & Sun, Ruiyi, 2023. "How does fintech affect bank risk? A perspective based on financialized transfer of government implicit debt risk," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; Auditing; Bank risk; Regulation; Bank regulation; Supervision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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