Borrowers’ discouragement and creditor information

Bank discouragement is one of the most important factors preventing firms from accessing credit. This discouragement stems from strong information asymmetry between firm and bank. To reduce this asymmetry, the latter can either gather information from the firm or access public information on the firm through credit databases. We argue that the presence of credit bureaus, set up by the regulator, which reduces information asymmetry, helps reduce banking discouragement. More specifically, this study is the first to use credit registries to capture the occurrence of screening errors. Our results clearly suggest that the probability of being discouraged decreases when creditor information is available. This phenomenon is even more obvious in regard to more opaque structures, such as risky firms or small and medium-sized firms. In contrast, relationship lending reduces the importance of external creditor information in determining the extent to which borrowers are discouraged. Our results are consistent with previous research on information asymmetry in financial intermediation and show the importance of the legal environment in which firms operate for their financial decisions.