Financing and access in cooperatives
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- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "Financing and Access in Cooperatives," IDEI Working Papers 404, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
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