Coordinating R&D efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
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More about this item
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2016-05-28 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2016-05-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2016-05-28 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2016-05-28 (Microeconomics)
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