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Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence

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  • Berninghaus, Siegfried K.
  • Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
  • Ott, Marion

Abstract

We conduct an experiment in continuous time: every subject can change her links to others and her action in a Hawk–Dove game, which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners, at any time. We hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links, and that players take these norms into account when deciding on their strategy. For such limitedly forward-looking players who consider othersʼ linking reactions we introduce a strategy adaptation rule (Anticipatory Better-Reply Rule, ABR) and a related stability criterion (Reaction-Anticipatingly Stable, RAS). Our data support our assumption on linking reactions. Subjects seem to take these reactions into account when deciding to switch from Hawk to Dove (ABR-behavior). However, better-reply behavior is prevalent when short-term profits allure. RAS configurations occur more often than Nash equilibria of the base game; however, with respect to stability they perform similar.

Suggested Citation

  • Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:35-52
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2016. "Limited farsightedness in network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 97-120.
    2. Offerman, Theo & Schram, Arthur & Van Leeuwen, Boris, 2014. "Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation," IAST Working Papers 14-16, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    3. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2013. "Equilibrium Selection under Limited Control - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk-Dove Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-048, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    4. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2011. "Complexity of Networking - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk Dove Game," FEMM Working Papers 110024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    5. Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2015. "Myopic behavior and overall utility maximization - A study of linked hawks and doves -," FEMM Working Papers 150014, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hawk–Dove game; Chicken game; Local interaction; Network formation; Network experiment; Forward-looking players;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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