Myopically Forward-Looking Agents in a Network Formation Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence
A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Hawk-Dove game with each of them. We design our experiment in continuous time where participants may change their Hawk-Dove action and/or their neighborhood at any point in time. We are interested in the resulting formation of networks and the action distributions. Compared with static Nash equilibrium (e.g., Berninghaus and Vogt, 2004, 2006; Bramoulle, Lopez-Pintado, Goyal, and Vega-Redondo, 2004) and social optimum as theoretical benchmark solutions, subjects seem to employ a more complex, forward-looking thinking. We develop an other benchmark solution, called one-step-ahead stability, that combines forward-looking belief formation with rational response and that fits the data much better.
|Date of creation:||31 Jan 2008|
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|Note:||Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.|
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